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INTRODUCTION
Florida shrimper Kenneth Farguson and his wife
were forced to sell everything they owned and live on their
boat.' Fifty-three year old Captain Charles C. Potter, who
has been shrimping the Gulf Coast for almost half his life,
is wondering how he will pay his $1,865 boat mortgage in
the absence of his once abundant shrimp sales.2 These and
many similar stories are increasingly common in the
southeastern states now that the U.S. market has seen an
influx of imported shrimp.
Between 2000 and 2002, southern U.S. shrimping
factories saw a 40% drop in employment.3  During this
same period, the U.S. increased its shrimp imports from
Vietnam and India to over $800 million.4 Meanwhile, in
Thailand, while Wichan Maungchanburi is unable to sell
'Bill Kaczor, As Shrimper Sells Nets For Food, Gov. Bush
Offers Industry Help, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, Jan. 17, 2003.
2 Jennifer Babson, Florida Shrimpers Hit Hard Times, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 2,2003.
3 Richard Burnett, StrugglingU.S. Shrimpers File
Antidumping Petition; An Industry Group Says Six Countries Sold
Shrimp At Artificially Low Prices, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 1, 2004.
• Margie Mason, Vietnam Loses Catfish Dispute; LA
Shrimpers React Favorably To Ruling By Trade Commission, THE
BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Jul. 25, 2003. Trade - Vietnam Shrimp
Committee Protests US Complaints, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEF SERVICE,
Jan. 2, 2004.
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his excess shrimp domestically,' he has found the U.S. to
be a much more receptive market. Today, Thailand
accounts for almost 50% percent of the frozen shrimp in the
U.S. market.
6
Surprisingly, that so many U.S. shrimpers have
found it difficult to make a living shrimping7 in light of the
fact that shrimp recently became the top-selling seafood in
the U.S.s Surpassing tuna in 2001, Americans consumed
1.4 billion pounds of the ten-legged, bottom-dwelling
crustacean. 9 While America's appetite for shrimp continues
to grow, U.S. domestic shrimpers now provide less than
twenty percent of the U.S. market.' 0 So, how should this
problem be handled? The question becomes one of utility
and economic efficiency; either foreign countries that
produce shrimp more efficiently should be permitted to
take advantage of their comparative advantages, or the
trade should be deemed unfair and thus regulated to protect
susceptible economies.
5 David Barboza, Even With Glut, Shrimp Farmers Want Still
More and Others Balk, THE N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2003.
6 Shawn Crispin, Thai Shrimp Spat Could Grow If US Pursues
Dumping Case, Trade Pact May Be Endangered, THE ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Jan. 16,2004.
7 Keith O'Brien, Prayers of the Shrimpers, THE TIMES
PICAYUNE, Mar. 16, 2003 (citing the Tariff Act of 1930 § 731, 19
U.S.C. § 16 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
8 Tom Murray, Imported Shrimp Helps Meet Consumer
Demand, Generating U.S. Econ. Activity Exceeding $9.8 Billion, PR
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 4, 2003.
9 Cain Burdeau, Shrimpers Find Hope in Tariffs, THE BATON
ROUGE ADVOCATE, Aug. 17, 2003.
10 Mark Holan, Shrimpers Seek Tariffs On Imports, TAMPA
TRiBUNE, Jan. 1, 2004. Also indicated in USITC Investigations Nos.
731-TA-1063-1068 (Preliminary) p.8, available at .
http://www.usitc.gov/ext-relations/newsrelease/2004/ER0217bbl.htm
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The Southern Shrimp Alliance (SSA), a group of
eight southeastern states consisting of forty-two shrimp
processors, has united in an effort to battle the importation
of under-priced shrimp in order to save their dying
industry."' Their proposed weapon is an antidumping tariff
on imports from Thailand, China, Vietnam, India, Ecuador,
and Brazil. 12  In order to win, the SSA not only must
convince the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) to
adopt this tarriff, but also must abide by the regulations of
the World Trade Organization's General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT). 3
The resolution will turn on the SSA's claim that the
U.S. shrimping industry has suffered a material injury
caused by foreign shrimping importation practices.' 4 Even
if it is found that the U.S. has suffered a material injury, the
question would then become whether it should permit an
exception to imposing antidumping duties for developing
countries under the theory of comparative advantage and
the promotion of free trade at the expense of protecting the
strength of its own domestic industries.
This note discusses areas of applicable law
governing antidumping, both in the U.S. and the World
Trade Organization (WTO), with respect to the potential
conflicting policies. In particular, it reveals a fragile policy
II U.S. Restaurants, Grocers, Seafood Distributors and Other
Consuming Industries Unite to Fight $2.4 Billion Shrimp Trade Case;
Shrimpers' Trade Petition Could Seriously Impact Price and
Availability of America's #1 Seafood; Hurt Consuming Industry Jobs,
PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 1, 2004.
12 India To Fight Out American Shrimpers, FINANCIAL
EXPRESS, Jan. 1, 2004.
'" 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
14 Benefit of Law Against Dumping Disputed; Terms of
Violation Open to Interpretation, THE TIMES PICAYUNE, Mar. 14,2004.
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balance between the WTO goals for the elimination of
trade barriers and the application of antidumping measures.
Part I provides a background of both U.S. customs
law and governing WTO regulations regarding
antidumping measures. Part II illustrates the treatment of
developing countries as a growing concern in the WTO.
Part III applies the provisions discussed in Part I and II to
the SSA's petition to impose antidumping duties on farmed
raised shrimp and prawns imported from India, Vietnam,
China, Thailand, Ecuador, and Brazil. Lastly, Part IV will
highlight certain areas within the U.S. customs law and the
WTO regulations that are problematic in an attempt to




A. What is Dumping?
The international trade world has an implicit
economic desire to avoid imbalance and maintain a fair
playing field. 16  "Dumping" is one example of an unfair
trade practice. "Dumping" is the act of selling excess
production of a certain product at a lower price in an
importing country than it would otherwise be sold for in the
15 All countries listed in the petition are members of the WTO
except for Vietnam. See infra Part IV.
' 6 The concept of comparative advantage involves the ability
to allow countries to produce those products in which they have an
advantage over other countries in production. However, sometimes
countries create factors, such as subsidies or taxes, in which the
advantage is strengthened or stunned by an exporting or importing
country. Creating a fair playing field moves to eliminate those extrinsic
factors to allow comparative advantage to take its course and overall
global economy to develop.
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exporting country. 17 It is a means for disposing of what
one country cannot consume and profiting from that which
would normally go to waste by under-pricing the product
and capitalizing on its demand.' 8  While some see
dumping as one country transferring their problems of
excess production to another, others view it as a
competitive strategic market maneuver.19
The WTO was established with the purpose of
promoting free trade in furtherance of globalization, a
movement to establish global principles for sound
agreements "rather than the use of force or the intimidation
of power." 20  In essence, the WTO seeks to reduce
protectionism and allow foreign industries to compete in
local markets. Competition creates a playing field where
only the strongest survive, thus producing a stronger global
economy. 21 The WTO has formed several agreements to
achieve this goal, and each WTO member imposes their
own trade regulations in compliance with the WTO's
agreements, such as that seen in the WTO Antidumping
Agreement.
22
17 RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 806 cmt. a (1987).
'S Understanding the WTO: The Agreements; Anti-dumping,
subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif_e/agrm8-e.htm.
19 John H. Jackson, Introduction: Perspectives on
Antidumping Law and Policy, in 1 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES I (Stephen M. Harris ed., 1979). See
also Christopher M. Barbuto, Note: Toward Convergence of Antitrust
and Trade Law: An International Trade Analogue to Robinson-
Patman, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2047,2084 (1994).
20 Alex Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values,
30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 430 (1997).
21 Id. at 446-47.
2 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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B. Antidumping in the US.
23
Title 19 of the U.S. Code covers custom duties and
is the heart of international trade regulation in the U.S.
Among the provisions in Title 19, is Chapter 4, the Tariff
Act of 1930 . This Act established a means for combating
unfair trade across U.S. borders, including dumping.25 19
U.S.C.S. §1673 provides the procedure for implementing
trade tariffs on products which are dumped in the U.S.
26
Therefore, when making a determination as to whether
antidumping tariffs should be imposed, the process should
be broken down into the following four phases: initiation of
investigations, preliminary determinations, final
determination, and assessment of a duty.
27
1. Initiation of Investigation
In the U.S., a producer or industry of a product may
petition to enact tariffs on importations of like products
from other countries.28 However, the producer or industry
must show that those imports are sold at less than normal
value, causing or threatening to cause the domestic industry
to suffer a material injury.
29
Two agencies play a pivotal role in making a final
decision as to the imposition of an antidumping duty, the
23 For the sake of this article, the discussion of imposing
antidumping duties is limited to the scope of the petition filed by the
Southern Shrimp Alliance. See Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping
Laws, 29 GEO WASH. J. INTL L. & EcoN. 1 (1995) (discussing a more
complete explanation of the entire procedure).
19 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1681 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
'5 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677(2000).
26 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000).
27See Bhala, supra note 23, at 28.
19 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2000 & Supp. 11 2003).
29 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
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Department of Commerce (DOC) and the U.S.
International Trade Commission (USITC). While the DOC
determines whether a product is being sold in the U.S. at a
lesser value than the price sold within the exporting
country, the USITC determines whether a U.S. industry has
been materially injured or threatened to be materially
injured by an alleged dumping. 30 The forgoing will outline
this basic process.
An industry party may file a petition simultaneously
with the DOC and USITC requesting an investigation on
their behalf, or the DOC itself may initiate investigations
when presented with the necessary elements according to
19 U.S.C. 1677.3' When filed by an industry party, the
DOC must verify that the petitioning party has established
a prima facie case for dumping no more than twenty days
after the petition was filed." In addition, the petition must
identify the like product, the domestic industry, and lost
sales for the past three years.33 Once established, the DOC
and the USITC initiate the preliminary determinations.
2. Preliminary Determination
34
The USITC is permitted forty-five days to
investigate the alleged injury sustained by a domestic
industry upon receipt of a petition or DOC initiation of an
investigation.3 5  Once filed, parties from both sides may
30 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1),(2) (2000).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1677.
32 19 U.S.C. § 1673c (2000 & Supp. 112003).
31 19 C.F.R.§ 207.11 (b)(2) (2005).
34 While there are several exceptions to extending deadlines,
for the sake of simplicity, the following will discuss typical preliminary
determinations.
33 The USITC and the DOC, while working separately,
cooperate with each other and are in constant communication pursuant
to 19 C.F.R. § 207.13 (2005).
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submit briefs, and if deemed necessary, the USITC may
hold a hearing. 36 Once the USITC has made a preliminary
determination, the DOC will continue to investigate
whether there exists a "reasonable basis" for why a country
is exporting aproduct to the U.S. at a price less than its
normal value. Because this investigation involves analysis
of multiple markets, including defining the product and the
normal value, the DOC is ranted one hundred forty days
to make this determination."
a. DOC Determination
The DOC's primary role in the process for imposing
antidumping duties is to investigate the "class or kind of
foreign merchandise ... being, or... likely to be, sold in
the U.S. at less than its fair value." 39 However, defining
the product can often prove difficult as a result of the
flexibility of the factors, but this is essential to an
investigation's outcome and the DOC's determination.40
According to 19 U.S.C. §1677, "like product" is
defined as those goods which are "like, or in the absence of
like, most similar in characteristics and uses." ''  Like
products may include similar products with minor
differences, similar products with a common use, or similar
products made of different materials but similar end uses.
42
36 There are two sides to the petition, one being the petitioner
and the other being all who oppose the petition. 19 C.F.R. § 207.15
(2005).
37 19 C.F.R. § 351.307 (2005).
38 19 U.S.C. § 1673b (b)(1)(A) (2000).
39 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (2000).
40 New World Pasta Co. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d
1338, 1352-57 (2004).
41 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (10) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
42 See Hosiden Corp. v. Advanced Display Mfrs. of Am., 85
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The DOC also makes a determination as to whether
the alleged product is being dumped in the U.S. 4 3 To do so,
the DOC evaluates the normal value based upon the price
sold for consumption in the exporting country. 44 In the
event that an inaccurate comparison causes for an incorrect
price,45 the DOC may elect an alternative calculation for
determining normal value.46  This alternative calculation
involves taking the cost of production and adding "an
amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of
containers, coverings, and other expenses. 'A7  If the
alternative calculation remains inaccurate, the DOC will
calculate the normal value from a production price which is
"comparable to the subject merchandise" from one or more
countries with a comparable market economy.48 It should
be noted that the added production costs include, but are
not limited to, labor costs, costs of energy to produce, and
pro rata costs of the equipment used in production.
49
Furthermore, the DOC is authorized to make
"adjustments" to the normal value when there exists two
levels of trade within the exporting country.50 Vis-i-vis the
WTO regulations on antidumping duties, the U.S. considers
F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir, 1996). See also Mitsubishi Heavy Indus.,
Ltd. v. United States (2000, CIT) 97 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (Ct. Int'l Trade,
2001). See also Chefline Corp. v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1320,
1323 (Ct. Int'l Trade, (2001).
' 19 U.S.C. § 1677.
44 19 U.S.C. § 1677(b).
45 Sometimes the product is not "sold" in the exporting
country because of the type of market. For instance, China is
considered a "non-market economy" because the price of a product is
determined by the government and not the market. For a definition of a
"non-market economy", see footnote 76.
46 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (a)(1)(C).
47 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (c)(1).
48 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (c)(2).
49 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (c)(3).
'o 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (a)(7).
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dumping as an unfair trading practice51 and therefore
allows alternative means for calculating the normal value in
order to save time and administrative expenses when
making determinations as to the presence of dumping.
52
Once the normal value has been established, it is
necessary to determine the dumping margin. The dumping
margin is the difference between the normal value and the
price sold in the U.S. 53 The DOC can then use the dumping
margin as a means for calculating the proper tariff.
54
b. USITC Determination
The USITC is responsible for determining whether
an industry has been "materially injured" or "threatened
with a material injury" as a result of the alleged dumping of
a product. 55 An industry is comprised of all the producers
of like products (e.g., all those who make cars) or all those
whose collective output makes up a major portion of a
product's production (i.e., manufacturers of car parts).56
While an industry is supposed to include those producers as
a whole within the U.S., an industry can be separated into
different markets if its producers provide most of the
5119 U.S.C. § 1337. Konstantinos Adamantopoulos and
Diego De Notaris, Essay: The Future of the WTO and the Reform of
the Antidumping Agreement: A Legal Perspective, 24 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 30, 32 (2000).52 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat.
144, S. Rep. No. 96-249, at 96 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
381,482.
5 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1)(B).
4 19 U.S.C. §1673e (2000).
55 19 U.S.C. §1673d (b)(1)(A) (2000). While there is another
determination of whether the industry is materially retarded (not
allowed to be established), for the purposes of this paper, the discussion
will be limited to an actual material injury or threatened material
injury.
' 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (4)(A) (2000).
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product for a particular region.57 Classifying an industry as
such depends solely on the DOC's definition of like
product.
"Material injury" is defined as "harm which is not
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.159  Upon
evaluating the material injury caused to a domestic
industry, the USITC considers the volume of imports,
effect of the imports on U.S. prices, and impact of like
product on the producers.6 0  In addition, the USITC
evaluates all economic factors such as declines in wages,
sales, and prices.
6 1
Ultimately, in conjunction with the DOC, the
USITC clarifies whether an alleged dumping has caused a
material injury to a U.S. industry. Here, the USITC must
find that the injury was caused "by reason of' the dumped
product.62 While there are several factors that indicate a
causal link, the U.S. Court of International Trade has often
focused its analysis on the conditions of competition,
6 3
which include an assessment of whether "the imports have
caused significant price depression or suppression" 64 in
order to find this requisite link.
3. Final Determination and Assessment of Duty
5' 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (4)(C).
s 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2)(B).
'9 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (7)(A).
60 19 U.S.C. §1677 (7)(B).
61 19 U.S.C. §1677 (7)(C)(iii).
62 19 U.S.C. §1673d (b)(1)(B).
63 Nucor Corp. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215-
16, (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004). See also Neenah Foundry Co. v. United
States, 155 F. Supp. 2d 766, 776-77 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001).
619 U.S.C. §1677(7)(C)(ii) (2006).
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The USITC then takes its affirmative finding and
determines whether the investigated imports "are likely to
undermine seriously the remedial effect of the antidumping
duty order." 65 This includes making a determination as to
the timing and volume of the product.66 Essentially, the
USITC seeks to discover whether the dumped product has
caused an incidental injury. To supplement the
investigation, the USITC sends questionnaires to all parties
involved.67 The USITC staff drafts a prehearing report, the
parties submit prehearing briefs, and the USITC conducts a
hearing within four days.68 Next, all parties present post
hearing briefs, at which time, those who were not parties to
the investigation have an opportunity to submit statements
for the purpose of persuading the USITC before it makes a
final determination.
69
Often times, either the petitioners or the DOC
require additional time to gather information. Depending
on the necessity of such extension, the DOC must make a
final determination either within seventy-five days or one
hundred thirty-five days after the its preliminary
determination is published.70 In the meantime, the DOC
ascertains the dumping margin for each exporter and then
collects a security deposit for each entry of an alleged
dumped product.71  Finally, the DOC corrects all
ministerial errors and publishes its final determination.72
19 U.S.C. §1673d (b)(4)(A)(i) (2006).
66 19 U.S.C. §1673d (b)(4)(A)(ii) (2006).
67 19 C.F.R.§ 207.20 (2005).
68 19 C.F.R.§§ 207.22-207.23 (2005).
69 See 19 C.F.R. § 207.25 (2005), 19 C.F.R. § 207.26 (2005),
and 19 C.F.R. § 207.29 (2005).
70 19 C.F.R. § 351.210 (2005) (enforcing 19 U.S.C. § 1673d).
71 19 U.S.C. § 1673d (c)(1)(B).
72 19 U.S.C. § 1673d (d) and 19 U.S.C. § 1673d (e).
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In the event that both the USITC and the DOC
make an affirmative determination as to dumping, a tariff
will be imposed at an amount equal to the dumping
margin.73
C. Antidumping Under General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs (GA 77) 74.
U.S. antidumping laws were drafted long before
GATT antidumping laws.75 Since the U.S. had a major
influence on the shaping of GATT, there exist many
similarities between the regulations. 76 Much like the U.S.,
GATT requires a country to show that a product is being
introduced within its borders at a price less than its normal
value. 77 Next, that country must prove that the exporting
country is dumping by showing a clear difference in prices
in the exporting country and the importing country.
78
Finally, that country must establish a causal link between
the dumping and the injury suffered by the domestic
industry.79 However, GATT's focus differs from that of
the U.S. Unlike U.S. laws, GATT's primary focus is on the
applicability of antidumping duties, rather than the
dumping practices.
80
1. GATT Article VI
71 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
74 While the WTO evolved out of GATT in 1994, the two
terms will be used interchangeably.
75 The U.S. antidumping regulations date back to 1916, while
the GATT was signed in 1947.
76 William Lovett, Essay: The WTO: A Train Wreck In
Progress? 24 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 410,426 n.9 (2000).77 GATT, 61 Stat. A3, A23, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
7' GATT, art. VI, § 1.
79 GATT, art. VI, § 6.
80 GATT, art. VI, §§ 2, 3. The focus is found in GATT Article
VI and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereinafter AD Agreement).
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Article VI provides the broadest antidumping
regulation found within GATT. It seeks to condemn the
practice of dumping while allowing those WTO member
countries who suffer injury as a result of dumping
retaliatory application of antidumping.
8
In order for a WTO member to enact antidumping
duties on an imported product, the member must find a
product that has been introduced into the domestic market
at a price that is less than normal value which causes or
threatens to cause a material injury to a domestic industry.
82
Normal value is derived from evaluation of the following
items: (1) the price of the like product consumed in the
exporting country; or (2) if there is no price in the
exporting countries (because of non-market economy)
83
then either a) the highest exporting price to a third country
or b) the cost of production in the exporting country, plus
additional costs for profits.8 4  This ability to choose
alternate pricing calculations is similar to that implemented
by the DOC. 5 Once dumping has been established, the
WTO member country may impose a levy upon the
dumped product, in an amount equal to the dumping
margin, for the purpose of offsetting the injury.
8 6
2. Implementation of Article VI in the AD Agreement.
81 Id.
82 Id.
3 The term "nonmarket economy country" means any foreign
country that the administering authority determines does not operate on
market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of
merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the
merchandise."' 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (18)(A).
4 GATT art. VI, § I (b). See also AD Agreement VI, 1, § 2.
85 See supra note 41.
6 Dumping margin is the amount equal to the price of the
dumped product in the importing country minus the normal value.
GATT art. VI, § 2.
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The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (AD
Agreement) governs the application of Article VI.87 While
Article 2 of the AD Agreement specifically regulates how a
country makes a determination as to an occurrence of
dumping, Article 3 establishes the guidelines for making a
determination as to injury.
a. Like Product
The GATT AD Agreement defines "like product"
as a product "which is identical (i.e., alike in all respects to
the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a
product, another product, which although not alike in all
respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the
product under consideration.), 88  The goal in providing
such a definition is hopefully to ensure that similar
products in different countries not receive discriminatory
treatment.
89
Since like product determines which companies are
assigned to a domestic industry, it is pertinent to define the
scope of the investigation. There has been much debate
over defining like product.90 While the WTO has yet to
provide a clear definition, there has been a constant dispute
over defining those conditions which constitute a like
product.9'
s7 AD Agreement, Part I, art. 1.
88 AD Agreement, art. 2.6.
" ROBERT HUDEC, GA 7TWTO Constraints on National
Regulation: Requiem for an "Aim and Effects" Test, in ESSAYS ON THE
NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 359, 365 (1999).
9 Id
91 See Appellate Body Report, Japan - Measures Affecting the
Importation of Apples [hereinafter Japan Appellate], WT/D5245/AB/R
(Nov. 26, 2003), available at
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Examination of other relevant GATT provisions, as
well as the European Commission's (EC) approach, may
provide some evidence as to how like product can be
defined. The term "like product" is used throughout GATT
in areas other than Article VI and the AD Agreement. In
Article I, the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment
proscribes that "any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties."92 Similarly, Article III, which
designates National Treatment on Internal Taxation and
Regulations, Article VIII, which gives MFN treatment to
markings of origin, Articles XI and XIII, which eliminates
and requires MFN treatment of Quantitative Restrictions,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/distabasewtp-members3
_e.htm. In a dispute between Japan and the U.S., where Japan applied
quarantine restrictions on certain bacteria infected apples imported
from the U.S., a distinction was required as to those infected apples and
non-infected, those apples prone to infection, or to all apples regardless
of their actual infection. The Appellate Body ultimately concluded that
the Panel could make factual determinations concerning all apples
imported from the U.S., giving the Dispute Settlement Panel the
authority to determine what are like products. See also Appellate Body
Report, Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R,
WT/DS84/AB/R, (Jan. 18, 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/trarope/dispu_e/7085d.pdf, involving
Korea maintaining certain tax rates for different types of liquor mainly
to support the Korean education system. Korea argued that Soju was
taxed differently because of the distinctive competitive nature primarily
consumption and price. Korea distinguished from those beverages
made from similar raw materials designed for "thirst quenching,
socialization" and the Korean Soju, pure ethyl alcohol made from sweet
potatoes and rice. The Appellate Body noted that while Soju and
imported liquors may have been classified as unlike products, Korea
could not discriminately tax certain liquors because "'like' products are
a subset of directly competitive or substitutable products."
92 GATT art. I.
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and Article XVI, which prohibits government subsidies
resulting in the exportation of a like product at a lesser
value in other countries, all contain some usage of the term.
However, none of these provisions provide a clear
definition of the term.
Where the GATT fails to clearly define like
product, the EC has attempted to provide some guidance as
to what the term should mean. The EC appears to
determine what constitutes like product by examining the
physical characteristics of products. Furthermore, it may
choose to implement the market-based approach or the two-
way interchangeability test in making its determination.
93
For example, in a dispute arising from the EC imposing
antidumping duties on China and Indonesia, the EC had to
determine whether slippers and outdoor shoes were the
same product. 94  The test implemented was whether
outdoor shoes could be substituted by slippers for outdoor
use, and whether slipPers could be substituted by outdoor
shoes for indoor use. Therefore, it appears that the EC
puts more emphasis on the substitution of products and thus
the product's physical characteristics, rather than similarity
of price when determining what constitutes like product.
96
b. Material Injury
The AD Agreement primarily illustrates the
application of calculating a material injury. Once the
normal value is calculated, it is compared to the exporting
price.97 The difference between the normal value and the
93 See Adamantopoulos, supra note 51, at 37.
94 See Japan Appellate, supra footnote 91, at 37.
95 Id.
96 See Adamantopoulos, supra footnote 93.
97 AD Agreement, art. 2.1.
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exporting price is the dumping margin. If the margin is
de minimis, then the dumping margin is considered
negligible, meaning that the injury is too small to be
actionable.99 However, if the margin is found to be more
than de minimus, the importing country may cumulatively
review all products imported and those products' collective
impact on the domestic industry.1
°°
A targeted country must also show a causal link
between dumping and an injury suffered to its domestic
industry. 1 1 Article 3 of the AD Agreement requires a
showing of the following to establish the existence of a
causal link: a) the effect on domestic prices caused by the
volume of the dumped imports and b) the effect on
domestic producers of like products. °2 Although both
criteria appear redundant, the former requires an evaluation
of the dumping country's actions while the later focuses on
the effects on the domestic industry.
As has been seen, several factors should be
considered when evaluating the impact of material injury.
Not only should the declination in sales be taken into
consideration, but also the severity of the dumping margin,
the effects on labor, and the ability or inability of the
industry to grow. 10 3  Therefore, the causation of injury
should be limited to that injury which has been foreseen
and is imminent and not merely one of allegation,
conjecture, or remote possibility.
" AD Agreement, art. 2.2.
De Minimis is defined under AD Agreement Article 5.8 as
the margin being less than 2% of the of the export price.
1oo AD Agreement art. 3.3.
1o1 AD Agreement art. 3.5.
102 AD Agreement art. 3.1.
103 AD Agreement art. 3.4.
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II. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TOWARDS DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
A. Background
The WTO divides trading parties into three
categories: developed countries, developing countries, and
least developed countries. 104  While the GATT articles
provide no explicit definitions as to the meaning of any of
these categories, there exists some evidence as to what
factors should help determine a country's status. The
United Nations has created a list of fifty countries making
up the least developed countries, thirty-two of which are
members of the WTO.' 0 5 Accordingly, one could assume
that a distinctive factor in determining a countryls status is
the country's gross domestic product (GDP). 106 However,
another distinction may exist in a country's sophistication
of trade regime. 10 7  Still, another factor could be the
relation to a country's per capita income.'0 8 Although not
entirely clear, all of the above factors surely bear some
significance on the determination of a country's status.
B. Developing Countries - A Growing Concern for the
WTO
104 Even though developing countries and least developed
countries are two distinct classes, both will be referred to as developing
countries.
1o5 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
available at,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intltemID=3432&lan
g=l \; and See Understanding the WTO at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tife/org7_e.htm.
106 Under GATT, several countries are grouped together and
referred to as a region, such as the European Union.
'07 CONSTANTINE MICHALOPOULOS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IN THE WTO 39 (Palgrave ed., 2001).
181d.
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While it may be difficult to distinguish each
category, it is clear that during the establishment of the
GATT following WWII, the international trading
community found it necessary to provide preferential
treatment to those countries not "developed."'10 From the
original GATT" Rounds in the 1940s to the current Doha
Rounds, protection of non-developed countries has always
been a concern."10 It should then follow that there exists an
interest in having developed countries consider the status of
developing countries when applying antidumping
measures.
1. History
Following World War II, the international
community sought to create a dependable world trading
system for the purpose of preventing future global
conflict.112 Ever since the establishment of GATT, there
has been a consistent interest in protecting the trade growth
of developing countries. 113 That interest persists today, as
developing countries have increased in membership to the
WTO. At its inception, nearly half of the countries which
made up the International Trade Organization would have
'09 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (April 1948), Chapter 1 Article 1 Objective 2.
" o See Final Act of the Uruguay Rouna
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/03-fa.pdf (last visited Mar.
23, 2006). See also Tokyo Round, Safeguard Action for Development
Purposes, paragraph 1,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/tokyoround/safeguarddcs.pdf (last
visited Mar. 23, 2006).
1 'Robert F. Housman, Symposium: Democratizing
International Trade Decision-making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 701-
702 (1994).
112 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 127 (2nded. 2001).
..3GATT art. IV.
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been considered developing countries by today's
standards. 114 However, today's developing countries and
least developed countries (LDCs) make up two-thirds of all
WTO members, evidencing the persisting interest in
promoting the protection of developing countries."1
5
Starting with the Geneva Rounds (1955-1956), the
GATT began to focus on trade in development for LDCs.
116
Trade liberalization in developing countries and
antidumping became pertinent issues during the Kennedy
Rounds between 1964 and 1967.117 The Agreement on
Antidumping was a product of the concern for potential
abuse of trade remedies as nontariff barriers (NTBs). In
addition, Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII were added to GATT
during the Kennedy Rounds, which compelled developed
countries to give preferential treatment for developing
countries in determining trade barriers, such as
antidumping duties.1l 8 However, developing countries
were not obligated to give the same treatment towards
developed countries."19 In addition to amending the AD
Agreement to strengthen the application of trade remedies
for the purpose of reducing NTBs, the Tokyo Rounds
(1973-1979) were also utilized to create the Enabling
Clause, 120 which is discussed subsequently.
1
4 The International Trade Organization was the original
name of organized countries which was never adopted by many
countries including the United States. See MICHALOPOULOS, supra note
107, at 23.
" .5 Understanding the WTO: developing countries,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatise/tife/devl_e.htm.
"6 BHALA, supra note 112, at 134.
t17 Id. at 825.
118 1d.
" 9 Id. at 137.
'20 Id. at 139.
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The Uruguay Rounds, which established the WTO
and solidified GATT, set forth two distinct ways by which
developing countries and LDCs would be treated
differently from developed countries by including further
non-reciprocity and time delays in WTO regulation
compliance. 12' However in the 2001 Doha Rounds, WTO
Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi made bold
statements regarding the increased responsibility developed
countries had towards developing countries in promoting
growth in international trade.'22
The Doha Rounds of negotiations continue to
discuss the necessity for providing market access for
developing countries and the relationship between trade
and development. 123 Concurrently, the Doha Rounds call
"2 Id. at 193.
1' Director General Supachai Pantichpakdi, American
Leadership and the World Trade Organization: What is the
Alternative?, Address Before the National Press Club (February 26,
2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spspe/spsp22_e.htm. See also
Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (November 20, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist e/min0l_e/mindecl_e.htm
From the outset, the function of the Doha round is to ensure the
stability in growth for developing countries. In the ministerial
declaration of the Doha Rounds, states: The majority of WTO members
are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at
the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.
Recalling the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue
to make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries,
and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the
growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development. In this context, enhanced market access, balanced rules,
and well targeted, sustainably financed technical assistance and
capacity-building programmes have important roles to play.
12 Doha Work Programme: Ministerial Declaration 2005,
WT/MIN(05)/DEC (Dec.22, 2005),
http://www.hkcsi.org.hk/reports/mc6/attl4.pdf. A "Work Programme"
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for an outcome that "should be effective in practice and
should enable developing countries to meet their needs, in
particular in food security and rural development."' 12 4 More
recently, great concern has been placed on limiting the
restrictions of compliance by providing developing
countries greater market access through partial exemptions
for reductions of tariffs.
125
All in all, GATT contains numerous agreements
from the Enabling Clause to the AD Agreement, which
provide developing countries special consideration for the
purpose of promoting greater partic 6Pation from those
countries in the global trading system.
2. GATT Provisions Providing Special Treatment for
Developing Countries
On November 28, 1979, GATT established the
Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, also
known as the Enabling Clause. 127 This provision directs
developed countries (1) to accord preferential treatment
towards developing countries by eliminating or reducing
trade barriers, (2) to provide developing countries more
access to markets in developed countries, and (3) to supply
technical assistance in regards to negotiating trade
is the agenda for the round of negotiations.
124 See Pantichpakdi, supra note 122.
'2 Negotiating Group on Market Access - Minutes of the
Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard, TN/MA/M/8 (May 26-
28, 2003), http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/markacce/ markacc _
neg oti e.htm#progmeet (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
126 MICHALOPOULOS, supra note 107, at 38-43.
1
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agreements. 12  Furthermore, Article 15 of the AD
Agreement demands that special regard be given by
"developed country Members to the special situation of
developing country Members when considering the
application of anti-dumping measures" while providing
"[p]ossibilities of constructive remedies.. .before applying
anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential
interests of developing country Members." 129 Although
there exists no guidance or mandate that explains exactly
what measures should be taken in order to exercise this
provision, it surely reiterates the concept that developed
member countries should provide additional special
treatment in trade practice to those countries who do not
share their status.
III. SOUTHERN SHRIMP ALLIANCE PETITION TO IMPOSE
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
A. Background
On February 17, 2004, forty-seven days after the
initiation of the investigation, the USITC preliminarily
determined that there were reasonable indications that
shrimp were being dumped in the U.S. market, 130 and this
had materially affected or threatened to cause material
injury to the U.S. shrimping industry.'31 This was the first
step in a long journey of convincing the USITC that the
U.S. should take affirmative action by imposing tariffs on
those shrimp that are dumped in the U.S. market. The final
determination was made on January 6, 2005.132 The USITC
12 Id.
29 AD Agreement art. 15.
30 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
131 USITC Investigations [hereinafter Investigations] Nos.
73 1-TA-1063-1068 (Preliminary) (2004).
132 Certain Non-Canned Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns From
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determined that all countries listed in the petition had
illegally dumped certain non-canned warmwater shrimp
and prawns and found Brazil, Ecuador, and India negligible




On December 31, 2003, the SSA filed a petition
with the USITC. 3 4 The petition alleged that the importing
of dumped frozen shrimp and canned warmwater shrimp
products from subject countries either had caused or had
threatened to cause a material injury to their industry that
produced like products. 1
35
The petition established the product, the industry,
the material injury faced, and the causal link pursuant to 19
CFR 207.11 (b)(2). 136 The product did not include every
facet of shrimp, but rather was limited to shrimp that were
"frozen or canned, wild-caught (ocean harvested) or farm-
raised (produced by aquaculture), head-on or head-off,
shell-on or peeled, tail-on or tail-off, deveined or not
deveined, cooked or raw, or otherwise processed in frozen
Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam Injure U.S.
Industry. (Jan. 6, 2005), http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/731-





134 Brief of Petitioner [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief] In the
Matter of: Certain Frozen and Canned Shrimp from Brazil, Ecuador,
India, Thailand, China, and Vietnam, No. A-351-838 (Ct. Dec. 3 1,
2003), available at http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/731-
1063/PrelimnI 98225/207211 /aeO/52E6B0.pdf.
135 Id at 1. Like product is defined under 19 U.S.C. §
1677(10) as "a product which is like, or in the absence of like, most
similar in characteristics and uses with, the article subject to an
investigation under this subtitle."
136 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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or canned form."' 137 The industry was to consist of forty-
two firms which included 2,124 shrimp processors and
related workers.
1. Defining Like Product
Determining what were and what were not similar
products was an important initial step in determining
whether dumping had taken place. In the briefs opposing
SSA's petition, there appeared to be one common argument
the petition should be rejected because of SSA's failure to
either include or exclude certain products or industries
related to the production of shrimp. Vietnam and Thailand
argued that canned shrimp should be classified as a
separate product.'38  Ecuador saw a distinction between
primary processed shrimp and those that had been modified
so that an additional feature had been added (value added),
such as breaded shrimp. 139 India, on the other hand, argued
that warmwater salad shrimp were different from other
frozen shrimp due to a size differential. 140  Finally,
137 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 134, at 3.
138 Postconference Brief of the Vietnamese Respondents
[hereinafter Vietnamese Brief] at 1, USITC Investigations Nos. 731-
TA-1063-1068 (Preliminary) (2004), available at
http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/731-
1063/Prelim/199877/208865/a3b/55875A.pdf. See also Postconference
Brief of the Thai Respondents [hereinafter Thai Brief] at 2, USITC
Investigations Nos. 731-TA-1063-1068 (Preliminary) (2004), available
at http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/731-
1063/Prelim/1 99876/208846/573/5587DA.pdf
139 Postconference Brief of the Ecuadorian Respondents at 43,
USITC Investigations Nos. 73 1-TA-1063-1068 (Preliminary) (2004),
available at http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/731-
1063/Prelim/1 99836/210271/d24/557324.pdf.
140 Postconference Brief of the Indian Respondents
[hereinafter India Brief] at 6, USITC Investigations Nos. 73 1-TA-1063-
1068 (Preliminary) (2004), available at
http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/731-
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Louisiana sought to join in by contesting that the petition
should have included fresh warmwarter shrimp with the
frozen warmwater shrimp. 14 1 But, as the many distinctions
continued, a line had essentially been drawn as to what
constituted like product.
2. Finding Material Injury
In this case, distinguishing the material injury was
just as important as defining the product. However, there
exists elasticity in determining the dumping margin and the
casual link between dumped shrimp and their impact on the
domestic industry.
The SSA petition focused primarily on "a
reasonable overlap in competition for cumulation."'142 In
other words, it had focused on the imports from all the
countries listed in the petition as a whole when assessing
the impact of the imports on the same geographical market
or customers. 4 3  SSA argued that because imports were
handled by the same brokers and wholesalers and that the
shrimp were interchangeable, the imported products were
reaching the same customers and seafood distributors as the
domestic products.'"
Under 19 U.S.C. §1677(24), if the imports from a
country are less than three percent of the volume of all
imports of the like product, those imports will be
considered negligible, signifying that the alleged dumping
1063/Prelim/199843/208922/dba/5587AF.pdf.
141 Postconference Brief of the Louisianan Respondents at 4,
USITC Investigations Nos. 73 1-TA-1063-1068 (Preliminary) (2004),
available at http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/73l -
1063/Prelim/199815/208810/57/5587D4.pdf.
142 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 134, at 16.
143 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
14 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 134, at 8-9.
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country is presumed as not intentionally harming or
threatening the domestic industry. 145  Thus, the
antidumping duties will not be imposed. Here, each and all
alleged countries, as illustrated in the petition, were
importing more than the three percent negligible threshold
and therefore were not automatically eliminated from
review.
46
Furthermore, the petition alleged that the U.S. was a
uniquely vulnerable market. 147  Japan, the U.S., and the
E.U. were the three most shrimp-consuming regions.' 14 The
SSA claimed that because the E.U. imposed harsher health
standards on shrimp and Japan's demand had leveled off,
the U.S. market was the "most attractive to shrimp
exporters." 49  Because U.S. shrimp consumption had
significantly increased over the past few years,'O the SSA
alleged that the increase in competition had allowed the
subject countries to take advantage of a growing market by
selling their excess production of shrimp at considerably
lower prices then the selling price in their own country-
hence, dumping. 15' The impact was most clearly depicted
in the sharp declination in revenue for domestic shrimp
fisherman, making it harder to pay for fuel, nets, and
supplies, which forced shrimpers out of the business of
selling shrimp.'
52
145 Contra supra note 71.
146 See generally Petitioner's Brief, supra note 134.
141 Id. at 16-19.
'4 id. at 22.
149 The EU is allowed to impose sanitary standards under the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
of GATT.
150 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 134, at 24.
"' Id. at 23-25.
52 Id. at 32.
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On the other hand, not surprisingly, the subject
countries made, contrasting arguments as to how their
exports were not in direct competition and why the U.S.
shrimp industry had faced an economic shift in the shrimp
market. Brazil contended that the E.U. was its primary
market for shrimp exports and that it was not dumping
because it did not have an excess production of shrimp.
Similarly, Vietnam stated that Japan was its main export
market and that it had been developing new markets.
54
India presented alternative explanations for why the U.S.
shrimp industry had suffered, citing unrelated economic
factors such as environmental regulations. 155 Thailand, on
the other hand, presented the argument that the E.U.'s
deterrence of Thai shrimp had caused them to become
increasingly competitive on the global market and not just
the U.S. domestic market. 156 Finally, Ecuador asserted that
the U.S. could not meet the demand for shrimp, which
appeared to be the most compelling argument since there
had been a substantial increase in the U.S. shrimp
consumption, and the subject countries had been able to fill
that demand.
C. The Commission's Views
Preliminary determinations required the USITC to
decide whether there was a reasonable indication that a
domestic industry had been materially injured or threatened
to be materially injured in order to proceed with the final
determinations. These determinations concerning dumping
153 Postconference Brief of the Brazilian Respondents at 2-3,
USITC Investigations Nos. 73 I-TA-1063-1068 (Preliminary) (2004),
available at http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/731-
1063/Prelim/199727/208738/c57/55544D.pdf.
154 See Vietnamese Brief, supra note 138, at 9.
155 See India Brief, supra note 140, at 14-19.
156 See Thai Brief, supra note 138, at 5.
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were to be based upon clear and convincing evidence with
no likelihood to the contrary that the defined product had
materially injured or threatened to injure the defined
industry.
1. Scope of Investigation
First, the USITC established the domestic like
product as well as the domestic industry. The USITC
adopted the description of like product proposed by the
SSA, which included a variety of species, food
preparations, and shrimp sizes.158 Their decision was based
upon rejecting the notion that "value-added" shrimp, salad
shrimp, giant freshwater prawns, canned shrimp, fresh
shrimp, and breaded shrimp should be removed from the
scope of like product by explaining that the products
contained no more than minor differences in physical
characteristics, end uses, and channels of distribution.
159
However, the USITC chose not to include fresh warmwater
shrimp even in light of the Louisiana petitioner's request.
160
Moreover, the USITC found that the industry
consisted of (1) all harvesters of warmwater shrimp and (2)
all processors of warmwater shrimp products based upon
the production-related activities and the related parties in
157 Certain Frozen or Canned Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns
From Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, Inv. No.
731-TA- 1063-1068 (Preliminary) USITC Pub. 3672 [hereinafter




59 Id. at 9-15.
160 Postconference Brief of the Louisiana Shrimp Association
at 4, 12, USITC Investigations Nos. 731-TA-1603-1608 (Preliminary)
(2004), available at http://edisweb.usitc.gov/edismirror/731-
1063/Prelim/1 99815/208810/57/5587D4.pdf.
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the petition. 16 1 The production-related activities included
machine peeling and deveining as well as commercial
cooking of shrimp. 162 The related parties included certain
processors who were also importers of the subject
product. 1
63
2. Finding of Material Injury
Investigations were limited to examining the
material injury for the data collected ranging from January
2000 through September 2003.164 By assessing the supply,
demand, volume, and price of the subject imports, the
USITC determined that there was a "reasonable indication"
that the domestic industry had suffered a material injury.
165
The U.S. industry, due to environmental concerns, high
land costs, and weather patterns, had become restricted to
seasonal wild caught freshwater shrimping.166 Therefore,
the shrimping industry was unable meet the U.S. demand,
which had risen from 909 million pounds in 2000 to 1.05
billion pounds in 2002.167 However, the rise in volume of
imported shrimp from 466 million pounds in 2000 to 650
million in 2002 was found to have caused the price of
domestic shrimp to fall in the third quarters from 2000 to
2002.168 The imported shrimp sold at such a low price
forced domestic producers to lower their prices.' 69 In a final
blow, the USITC rejected the subject countries' argument
that there were too many fishermen in U.S. seas.
161 See Investigation, supra note 157 at 15-19.
162Id. at 17.
'63 Id. at 18.
164Id. at 10.
'65 Id. at 23.
'66 Id. at 23-24.
167 See Investigation, supra note 157, at 23-24.
I Id. at 25-28.
169Id. at 28.
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The USITC also considered other factors, namely
those required by U.S. antidumping procedures as well as
those rules permitted by GATT, regarding the impact from
imports.170 In addition to income tax statements showing
substantial losses and declines in operating performance,
most striking was the decline in U.S. shrimpers' average
daily wages, which fell from $116.97 in 2000 to $68.26 in
2002.171 From these financial statistics, the USITC went on
to make its final determination.
D. Final Determination
On January 6, 2005, the USITC determined that
non-canned warmwater shrimp and prawns imported from
Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam had
materially injured the U.S. shrimping industry. 172 In
addition, the USITC concluded that China, Thailand, and
Vietnam were negligible for dumping certain canned
warmwater shrimp and prawns. 173 From the USITC's final
determinations and recommendations, the DOC set various





172 Certain Frozen or Canned Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns
From Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, Inv. No.




174 Fact Sheet: Amended Final Determinations and Issuance of
Antidumping Duty Orders: Import of Certain Frozen Warmwater
Shrimp from Brazil, Ecuador, India, Thailand, the People's Republic of
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IV. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Problems with U.S. Antidumping Laws and WTO
Antidumping Regulations
1. U.S. Responsibility
Occurring almost simultaneously with the U.S.
shrimp dumping investigations, the WTO allowed the
European Communities to suspend its GATT obligations
against the U.S. for its failure to bring the Antidumping Act
of 1916 into conformity with the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body's recommendations. 175 Such conformity would
provide the U.S. an opportunity to take a good look at its
antidumping laws and examine how they affect global trade
positively or negatively. Although the U.S. has the most
sophisticated antidumping procedures, with that brings the
price of costly litigation which most developing countries
are unable to afford and therefore unable to defend. Thus,
in order for the system to be truly fair, reformation of the
current standards would seem a necessary step.
2. Problems with Antidumping Procedures - Excessive
Flexibility
a. Contradictive Purpose
Although the WTO has set out to allow for the
"optimal use of the world's resources" by focusing on the
"substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade
and to the discriminatory treatment in international trade
relations,"1 76 the WTO has appeared to have contradicted
75 See Appellate Body Report,U.S. - Anti-Dumping Act of
1916, WT/DS136/ARB (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http:l/trade-
info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2004/february/tradoc_ 115972.pdf.
176 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, art. 1, § A (2006), available at
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its own purpose. By permitting countries to impose
antidumping regulations, it has promoted the use of other
barriers for discriminatory treatment. Thus, a WTO
member is provided a loophole to move forward with any
goal it may have toward a policy of protectionism. A clear
example is seen in the SSA's efforts to protect the U.S.
shrimping industry, which had suffered due to the increase
of importation of foreign shrimp through the optimal use of
a trade barrier, namely antidumping measures.
b. Ambiguity of Like Product
The apparent discrepancy in determining what
constitutes like product allows each country attempting to
impose antidumping duties to strategically include or
exclude products which may or may not be suffering a
material injury. In the long run, this may allow a country to
beef up its industry and include products to which the
alleged dumping party may not have access or produce.
While "like product" under Article VI is different from
"like product" under Article III, a greater emphasis should
be placed on the economic competitive market comparisons
rather than actual physical characteristics. Otherwise,
developed countries will be able to dominate those
industries they have chosen to protect.
In the shrimp dispute, the DOC and USITC
included a rather broad range of shrimp when defining the
product. 77 What started as a petition for frozen and canned
warmwater shrimp grew to include freshwater shrimp.
78
The SSA's action in broadening the scope of like product
clearly represents an attempt to employ a policy of
http://www.wto.org/English/rese/bookspe/analyticindexe/wto-agr
eeO1le.htm.
17 See Investigation, supra note 157.
178 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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protectionism in the shrimping industry. While many U.S.
courts have provided factors for determining like
product,179 the WTO has provided minimal guidance.'"0
Perhaps because the WTO dispute panel is fairly new, the
WTO has yet to revamp the AD Agreement articles
concerning the definition of like product. However, once
cases have been litigated through the WTO, hopefully, a
clearer definition of like product will be established.
c. Conjuring Normal Value
By providing differing means for calculating normal
value based on different economies under 19 U.S.C. §1673
and Article 3 of AD Agreement, it appears that the DOC
possesses the capacity to fluctuate the margin of dumping
between the normal value and the price of the product sold
in the U.S. This leeway arguably provides a domestic
country with the ability to increase the number of
antidumping duties, thus over-compensating an injured
domestic industry and in turn, producing unfair subsidies.
As such, antidumping duties would no longer be used as a
remedy for unfair trading but more as an economic
crippling weapon, which would no doubt defeat the original
intended goal of such measures.
For example, while China's nonmarket economy is
evolving from a developing country to a more developed
country, a more reliable formula for calculating normal
value, aside from the comparison of like products sold in
other countries, would prove beneficial. As the standard
for calculating normal value stands today, antidumping
duties could be placed on practically any Chinese product
which could prove devastating for a country whose
economy is in the process of making a major transition.
179 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
0o See GATT art. 1.
Shrimp Dumping
B. Proposed Solution
I propose that the level of ambiguity could be
somewhat diminished through the introduction of a
predatory intent element. If adopted, in order to prove
intent, a party alleging dumping would need to provide
evidence of participation in past dumping, specific
targeting of dumped products, and conspiracy to reduce
prices. Introduction of such a standard may also take some
of the bite out of the excessive flexibility provided in both
the U.S. and WTO dumping standards by imposing an
additional burden on the country seeking relief.
Furthermore, it would ensure that those countries charged
with dumping are not unnecessarily punished absent proof
of intent.
Although this would allow for less flexibility for
developed nations, it could also cause for an increase of
costs associated with an already expensive process
therefore defeating the very goal it seeks to attain.
Additionally, such a standard would require that fuller
disclosure be provided amongst countries. More
transparency would more clearly portray how governments
and the WTO litigate antidumping procedures. However,
large, developed countries would likely oppose such
transparency because those countries charged with
dumping would be more capable of defending dumping
allegations.
The SSA petition provides no indication that shrimp
was dumped intentionally. It is unclear whether the
countries intended to dump or whether they were merely
taking advantage of what they saw as a viable market. In
either case, the SSA's attempt to impose antidumping
tariffs on those countries included in the complaint
resembles unfavorable protectionist policies and clearly
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conflicts with the WTO's goal of developing the global
economy and eliminating unfavorable protectionist
practices. Introduction of an element of intent may ensure
that the WTO's goals are not compromised and that the
implementations of antidumping tariffs are not abused.
CONCLUSION
As they currently stand, the WTO and U.S. laws
regarding dumping provide excessive flexibility to those
countries alleging dumping. As a result of this flexibility,
those countries seeking relief are provided the opportunity
to impose trade tariffs that are crippling to developing
countries and clearly contradict the WTO's goal of
promoting global trade and preventing protectionist
activities.
Introduction of an element of intent could help to
level the playing field for developing countries by
increasing the burden on those countries seeking relief.
Although fair, the level of transparency imposed resulting
from the introduction of such a standard would
undoubtedly be opposed by the most industrially developed
countries.
The SSA's case provides a good example of how
the current standards can be manipulated in favor of the
most industrially developed countries to promote
protectionist policies by means of the most effective trade
barrier-antidumping tariffs.
